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Abstract
Brideprice is a marital wealth transfer from a groom to his bride’s parents. Many
developed countries once had this practice and witnessed its decline, while some less
developed countries are in the middle of cultural change. Economic development
has been indicated as a closely related factor, but little is known about exactly what
contributes to the decline of brideprice practices. Based on the regression kink de-
sign framework exploiting primary education reform in Uganda, we find that female
education reduces the probability of a brideprice payment. This finding suggests
that female education is one of the factors facilitating cultural decline and helps
explain the disappearance of the brideprice practice in contemporary high-income
countries and its current decline in Africa. We do not find evidence that the human
capital compensation hypothesis or assortative matching explains the decline in
the brideprice practice. We consider as the potential mechanisms (1) the trade-off
for the bride’s parents between immediate brideprice payment and altruistic utility
from their daughter’s sound marriage without brideprice and (2) the intrahousehold
bargaining power between the bride and groom.
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1 Introduction
Brideprice is a marital wealth transfer sent from the groom to the parents of the bride.1
Brideprice used to be practiced in many parts of the world, including contemporane-
ously high-income countries, where the amount of brideprice payment is reported to have
been so significant that it sometimes represented a large burden, particularly for poor
households (Anderson, 2007). Although the practice has been largely discontinued in
such countries, it is still prevalent in many parts of Africa. Anecdotes indicate that
brideprice serves as a token of gratitude to the bride’s parents for their efforts in raising
their daughter. Observationally, brideprice is practiced more frequently in areas with
high virilocality—the bride leaves her natal family and joins the groom’s family upon
marriage—polygyny—a man marries more than one woman—and high female engage-
ment in household agriculture (Anderson, 2007; Goody, 2011).
The economic literature on brideprice suggests that it compensates the bride’s family
for the labour income that she would have earned and contributed to her family if she
were not married (Becker, 1991; Anderson, 2007). In this framework, brideprice posi-
tively reflects female education to the extent that human capital matters for her foregone
economic activities.2 Recent studies have also considered the brideprice practice as an
indicator of greater female agricultural engagement after marriage (e.g., Jacoby 1995).
Partly due to this economic contribution, females from ethnicities that have historically
practiced brideprice are found to be less likely to suffer from domestic violence (Alesina
et al., 2016). When the costs of primary education are lowered, only parents from the
1Anecdotes suggest that there are cases in which the groom’s parents help him with this wealth
transfer. There are also cases where this wealth transfer is only agreed upon at the establishment of the
marriage, and the actual payment is made later. In this particular study, we use data from Uganda,
where it is usually only the groom who pays, and the transfer can be made later. We discuss these
particular contexts in more detail in the subsequent sections.
2The positive association between brideprice and female human capital is also posited in social sciences
other than economics (e.g., Bell 1998; Goody 2011).
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ethnic groups practicing brideprice are shown to invest in female education (Ashraf et al.,
2020). In addition to the human capital hypothesis, upon which these studies are based,
assortative matching in the marriage market also implies a positive association between
brideprice and female education. That is, educated women are likely to marry educated
men who are likely to be from wealthy families.
This stream of the literature takes brideprice culture for granted and, within a given
cultural framework, analyses the positive relationship between the human capital accu-
mulation of females and the amount of brideprice. Since an increase in female education
is a typical phenomenon during economic development, it may lead more parents to in-
vest more in female education and demand marital wealth transfer, as demonstrated by
(Ashraf et al., 2020). Parents of daughters, in fact, seem to consider marital transfer
an important financial source, at least in the short run, since early marriages of daugh-
ters are found to increase during periods of transitory economic shocks in societies with
brideprice culture (Corno et al., 2020). It may thus be unsurprising if, as a result, the
share of marriages with a brideprice payment increases in a country with an increase in
female education. However, history in the longer run suggests the opposite: brideprice
culture has disappeared during economic development, despite an increase in female edu-
cation. As Anderson (2007) points out, little is known about how brideprice culture has
diminished and how it is related to the process of economic development.
Other studies have examined the strategic behaviours of the husband, the bride, and
the bride’s parents when bargaining over the brideprice payment. For example, the
existence of a brideprice payment at marriage is found to be correlated with an increased
probability of divorce (Platteau and Gaspart, 2007). Gaspart and Platteau (2010) models
and empirically tests the possibility that the parents of the bride may accept a lower
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brideprice if they worry about the likelihood of their daughter’s divorce and the resulting
loss of altruistic utility. Although these analyses consider bargaining over the amount
of the brideprice, it is possible that these strategic motives lead the marriage to involve
no brideprice at all. We thus intend to empirically analyse when such a cultural decline
occurs and whether it is related to an increase in female education.
Specifically, we estimate the effect of female education on the cultural practice of
brideprice payment, exploiting the introduction of universal primary education (UPE) in
Uganda. This reform abolished school fees for all pupils who were enrolled in primary
schools in and after 1997. The reform was announced in December 1996 and initiated
in January 1997 and thus was almost surely unpredictable by Ugandan families. Since
it affected everyone who was in school at the time it was introduced, the benefits of the
reform were lower for older cohorts and greater for younger cohorts. As such, the increased
years of education shows a clear kink when shown in a graph on the year of birth. This
exogenous source of variation is used in our fuzzy regression kink design estimation to
investigate the relationship between female education and brideprice culture.3
While it is difficult to collect historical data from countries that have already experi-
enced a decline in brideprice practices, countries that are going through relevant cultural
changes provide an ideal case for studying the factors contributing to the disappearance
of brideprice culture. Uganda is a particularly suitable case, as almost 100% of its pop-
ulation had practiced brideprice until approximately the 1980s. However, recently, this
practice has been diminishing (Anderson, 2007). Together with this decline in brideprice
payments, there has been a significant increase in female educational attainment due
3We find that the reform increased educational attainment among females but not among males,
whose educational attainment had already been above the primary level prior to the UPE. This finding
is consistent with that of Keats (2018) and implies that the effect of education is not realized by males
but rather by females.
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primarily to the UPE, which was not anticipated.
We first find that being born one year later increases educational attainment for
females who were exposed to UPE by approximately .2 to .4 years, in addition to the
general trend observed for females who were not exposed to UPE. Exploiting this as an
exogenous variation, we then find that a one-year increase in female education reduces
brideprice practice by approximately 9.9 to 12.3 percentage points. At the same time, we
find no evidence that more years of education lead to an increase in the non-agricultural
job status of women. We do not find any change in assortative matching in terms of male
and female education or in marital characteristics such as polygyny and love marriage.
These results indicate that the decline in brideprice payment is not due to a change
in the valuation of female productivity or a matching pattern in the marriage market.
In other words, the results suggest that the decline in brideprice culture may not be
consistently explained by conventional theory, such as assortative matching and human
capital compensation.
From our estimation results, we discuss possible mechanisms through which female
education led to this cultural decline. That is, better educated females and their parents
may become more aware of the potential downsides of brideprice, such as differential
practices of sexual infidelity between spouses (Bishai and Grossbard, 2010), domestic
violence (Kaye et al., 2005), and divorce (Platteau and Gaspart, 2007; Gaspart and
Platteau, 2010), which are likely to reduce the utility of married females.4 When the
parents of better educated females make a decision about whether to receive a brideprice
payment, altruistic parents face the tradeoff between the immediate payment of brideprice
and the future sound marital life of their daughters. If their altruistic utility increases in
4From local media reports, it appears that brideprice practice is still common in Uganda, where these
potential downsides of brideprice are also sometimes discussed (New Vision, 2016a,b; Daily Monitor,
2016a,b, 2017, 2018a,b,c, 2019).
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female education, they may choose not to receive brideprice payment. This interpretation
follows the discussion by Gaspart and Platteau (2010). Another hypothesis based on
anecdotal evidence from our field work is that better educated brides are likely to have
greater bargaining power relative to their grooms and may thus demand marriage without
brideprice payment. This is because the presence of brideprice payment may increase
female disutility from marriage due to domestic violence and differential spousal infidelity.
It may also raise the cost of divorce, as the refundable brideprice serves as debt for the
female and her parents.
As Gaspart and Platteau (2010) emphasize, these proposed mechanisms do not rule
out the existing models. Rather, we claim that one next step for future study is to unify
these complementary approaches. We discuss a potential direction of future research
toward unifying these approaches.
We contribute to the brideprice literature by providing a new piece of evidence that
the cultural practice can change and decline when female education increases. Most
studies in the brideprice literature have examined the intensive margin: within a given
cultural framework, they analyse the relationship between the amount of brideprice and
socio-economic variables, including human capital investment. Our study considers the
extensive margin: we investigate when and why brideprice culture declines. Our finding
suggests that female education is likely one of the factors that facilitate cultural decline
and help explain the disappearance of brideprice practice in contemporary high-income
countries and its current decline in Africa. Additionally, we provide the first empirical
evidence based on a natural experiment on the impact of female education, as the available
studies have relied on cross-sectional variation due to data limitations. More broadly,
our study is related to the growing literature on culture and institutions (Alesina and
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Giuliano, 2015). In particular, it shows evidence of how an institution that is aimed at
accelerating human capital accumulation affects local culture in the course of economic
development.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief
overview of the related economic literature. After a summary on primary education
reform in Uganda, we describe our dataset and identification strategy. Then, we present
the estimation results and discuss our interpretation. The last section concludes by
discussing implications for Uganda and for future studies.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Marriage and brideprice in Sub-Saharan Africa
Wealth transfers upon marriage are termed differently depending upon who sends and
receives them. They are called brideprice if the groom and his family send them to the
bride’s parents and dower if they send them to the newly married couple, particularly
the bride. Similarly, transfers from the bride’s side are called dowry if the groom receives
them and groomprice if the groom’s family receives them (Papps et al., 1983). Among
these four channels, we focus on brideprice, which is predominant in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2007).
The economic research related to brideprice can be traced back to at least the seminal
work by Becker (1991) on the marriage market, in which women and men search for their
marriage partner. His model suggests that assortative matching and compensation for
human capital can affect brideprice.5 First, assortative matching—men and women with
5Marriage squeeze, another potential factor that can affect brideprice, is a situation in which the
numbers of men and women are unbalanced in the marriage market, at which point marital payment
arises for the purpose of clearing the market. An excess supply of men in the marriage market incentivizes
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similar traits are more likely to marry than are those with dissimilar traits—suggests
that a more educated woman is likely to marry a more educated man who is also likely
to come from a wealthier family. Thus, a more educated woman may be paid a larger
brideprice than a less educated woman. In Sub-Saharan Africa, assortative matching is
found to have a strong influence on marital formation and wealth transfer in Ethiopia
(Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005a,b).
Second, the human capital compensation hypothesis suggests that brideprice is larger
for women with greater human capital because it compensates their parents for letting
go of a family member that could provide labour (Becker, 1991). This hypothesis can
be particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa, where women’s contribution to house-
hold agricultural production is significant, and virilocality is common (Anderson, 2007).
However, empirical evidence on the human capital compensation hypothesis is relatively
scarce in the literature; the available studies include Platteau and Gaspart (2007) and
Ashraf et al. (2020).
Platteau and Gaspart (2007) show that brideprice is significantly higher for educated
women compared to uneducated women in Senegal based on small cross-sectional data.
Ashraf et al. (2020) employs a quasi-experimental method to examine the impact of
female education on brideprice. Exploiting the regional variation in school openings and
the fact that only a subset of ethnic groups practice brideprice payment, their triple
difference estimation shows that school construction booms in Indonesia and Zambia
increased the bride’s level of education only among brideprice-practicing ethnic groups,
which then led to larger brideprice payments. The above authors claim that brideprice
them and their parents to pay a higher brideprice (Becker, 1991). This situation, however, appears less
relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa, where son preference is not found (Rossi and Rouanet, 2015). In contrast,
marriage squeezes have been investigated intensively in South and East Asia, where son preference is
observed (e.g., Rao 1993; Francis 2011).
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culture incentivises parents to invest in girls’ education, which indeed leads to higher
brideprice payments.
One seemingly missing piece in these studies is viewpoints on whether the cultural
practice of brideprice payment has declined and, if so, whether this decline is in any way
related to female education. Instead, within the given cultural framework, these studies
consider how education and brideprice interact. That is, the human capital compensation
hypothesis claims that brideprice increases when females have greater human capital,
since it can make her family better off through greater household income and more efficient
home production. The assortative matching hypothesis also states that brideprice is larger
for highly educated women than for less educated women because highly educated women
are likely to be matched with a highly educated, and therefore wealthy, man. These
hypotheses are concerned with the intensive, and not the extensive, margin of cultural
practice, which seems to be a serious theoretical limitation, as societies experiencing
major changes such as an educational reform can exhibit changes in the extensive margin;
i.e., individuals can stop practicing brideprice. This paper sheds light on this issue and
attempts to empirically investigate when cultural practice declines.
Another strand of the literature has analysed the strategic behaviours of the groom,
the bride, and her parents to further deepen the economic understanding of the causes and
consequences of the brideprice practice. Bishai and Grossbard (2010) postulate and show
that brideprice payment in Uganda is associated with a lower probability of adultery on
the part of the wife but not the husband. The proposed logic behind this finding is that
the payment of brideprice that the husband can recover upon marital disruption increases
his intrahousehold bargaining power, suppressing his wife’s extramarital relations but not
his own. Gaspart and Platteau (2010) analyse the decisions of the husband and the bride,
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in addition to those of her father, who is altruistic towards the bride, where the agents
face a bargaining situation over the brideprice. To the extent that the bride’s parents care
about the probability of her marital dissolution, modelled as a function of brideprice, or
that parental altruistic utility depends on the bride’s persuasion, which may be affected
by her educational attainment, her parents may decrease the amount of the brideprice,
for which the authors show empirical evidence.6 These studies imply that an increase
in female education may lead to a rise in her bargaining power against her husband or
her father and thus to an overall decline in brideprice practice. However, findings from
these studies may not bear causal interpretation due to the lack of a credible identification
strategy and small sample sizes. Our study attempts to provide the first piece of evidence
by employing a novel causal estimation method applied to our own collected data and
interpreting our findings in light of anecdotes assembled from our field work.
2.2 Literature on culture and institutions
From a broader perspective of the economic literature, our present paper can be con-
textualized as an empirical study on the relationship between culture and institutions.
According to a recent survey (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015), one approach is to build a
model in which culture and institutions affect each other and analyse their co-evolution
(e.g., Alesina et al. 2015 and Fernández 2013). Studies using this approach, however,
inevitably face empirical difficulty in identifying the two-way influencing system (Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015).
The other approach is to analyse the one-way influence of culture on institutions or
vice versa. In this stream of the literature, it seems that many studies have looked at
6As Gaspart and Platteau (2010) note, these analyses do not entirely replace the approach based
on marriage market interactions (Becker, 1991); rather, they complement the behavioural analyses by
bringing individual strategic motives into the analytical framework.
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the effects of culture on economic variables: examples include the effect of individualistic
norms on agricultural production (Olsson and Paik, 2016) and the effect of witchcraft
beliefs on social capital formation (Gershman, 2016). A relatively limited number of
studies have examined the effects of institutions on cultural variables, such as the land
titling effect on individualism and materialism (Di Tella et al., 2007) and the impact of
commercial legislation on church going and religious donations (Gruber and Hungerman,
2008). Our present paper adds a new piece of evidence to this strand of the literature,
as it investigates the effect of a formal institution—a primary education policy—on a
cultural behaviour—brideprice practice.
The study most closely related to ours is Ashraf et al. (2020), which examines the effect
of female education on brideprice. While the above authors consider the intensive margin
of the brideprice culture—whether female education increases brideprice—our current
study focuses on the extensive margin—whether female education renders a decline in
brideprice culture. By providing new empirical evidence on the effect of female education
on brideprice culture, our study contributes to the emerging literature on the relationship
between culture and institutions.
3 Universal Primary Education in Uganda
The educational system of Uganda consists of 7 years of primary education, 6 years of
secondary education, and 3 to 5 years of tertiary education. Children are supposed to
commence schooling at the age of 6. The net enrolment rate was low before the start of
universal primary education (UPE): among children aged 6 to 12 years, 62.1% attended
primary school in 1992 (Deininger, 2003). There were also large disparities across income
levels and geographic locations. For example, the attendance rate was higher in urban
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areas (78%) than in rural areas (66%) (Demographic and Health Survey, 2004).
A major impediment at that time was said to be the costs of schooling, both direct and
indirect, borne by parents and family. Tuition paid by households covered more than 80%
of the total finances of schools (Nishimura et al., 2008). Households also paid other costs
of education, including costs for uniforms, textbooks, and contributions to the Parents
and Teachers Association (PTA). These costs were likely a heavy burden particularly for
poor households. In fact, only 45.7% of children from low-income households attended
school, while the equivalent figure was 81.7% for those from high-income households
(Demographic and Health Survey, 2004).
To tackle the financial problem of education, a reform called ‘universal primary educa-
tion’ (UPE) was initiated in January 1997 that eliminated school fees (Uganda Bureau of
Statistics, 2003). Specifically, the UPE scheme provided each school with enough funding
to cover private education costs such as tuition and PTA contributions (Ministry of Edu-
cation and Sports, 1999). Uganda had, by then, put into practice a variety of educational
reforms likely to bring about qualitative improvements in education, such as curriculum
changes, teacher training, and primary completion examination criteria. However, it was
not until December 1996 that the abolition of school fees was announced by President
Museveni, who had been elected in May 1996 (Grogan, 2008). The announcement was
followed by a governmental advertising campaign, which informed nearly all parents and
guardians of school-age children of the reform (Demographic and Health Survey, 2004).
The UPE reform resulted in monumental changes in Uganda. The number of enrolled
children aged 6 to 8 increased from 2.7 million in 1996 to 5.3 million in 1997 and further
to 7.3 million in 2002 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2003). With the gross enrolment
rate rising from 74.3% in 1995 to 135.8% in 2000, the reform was said to have achieved
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universal access to primary education (Riddell, 2003). The effect of UPE was found to be
larger for girls and poor households than for boys and wealthier households (Deininger,
2003; Nishimura et al., 2008). Additionally, the reform reduced delayed enrolment and
increased the probability of completing higher grades (Nishimura et al., 2008). Although
there are still quite a few people who never attend or who drop out of school (Demographic
and Health Survey, 2001), it would not be an exaggeration to say that Uganda’s UPE has
been successful in increasing educational attainment. We take advantage of this sudden
increase in education brought about by the UPE to investigate the impact of education




This study uses data obtained from the fifth wave of the Research on Poverty, Envi-
ronment, and Agricultural Technologies (RePEAT) survey in Uganda, undertaken from
September through December 2015. The RePEAT survey comprises a panel dataset from
the first wave in 2003 to the fifth wave in 2015. In 2003, 10 randomly chosen households
were interviewed from each of 94 randomly chosen rural villages from the eastern, western
and central districts (Yamano et al., 2004). In 2015, the survey was extended to cover
five more randomly selected households in each of the formerly surveyed villages, and 23
additional villages (15 households each) were added from two northern districts. In total,
the 2015 RePEAT survey constitutes a dataset of 1,755 households from 117 villages.
The RePEAT survey is designed to collect data on the agricultural activities of rural
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households. In the fifth wave, a specially made questionnaire was added to ask about
individual characteristics and behaviours at the time of marriage, including brideprice
payment.
The questions about brideprice payments were asked only for each female’s first mar-
riage for the following reasons. First, the brideprice agreed upon at the time of the first
marriage is likely to correctly measure the value of parental investment in the bride’s hu-
man capital to the extent that her parents do not anticipate the divorce and remarriage of
their daughter when she marries for the first time (Arunachalam and Logan, 2016). Sec-
ond, the decision-making mechanism for brideprice in a remarriage may be different than
that in the first marriage, and these differences may depend on many factors, such as the
gender of the person who remarries;7 whether the remarriage follows divorce, separation,
or widowhood; and unobservable factors including feelings about remarriage. This study
avoids the analytical complications arising from these complexities by focusing only on
women’s first marriage.
This study sample consists of females who had ever been married at the time of
the survey and were between 24 and 49 years of age.8 We imposed this age restriction
expecting to obtain a representative sample of females in this age group in rural Uganda
because the median age at first marriage was 17.9, and the share of females who had
never married in the age group between 25 and 29 years was 5.6%, with a sharp decline
from 23.9% in the age group between 20 and 24 years (Demographic and Health Survey,
7For example, Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2005b) find that men and women remarry with signifi-
cantly different probabilities in Ethiopia, the country just north of Uganda.
8Attempts were made to ask questions of the females themselves. However, a proxy interview was
allowed if the female was unavailable and the alternative respondents knew a great deal about her first
marriage. Another attempt was made to collect information from male respondents, since if a male
interviewee had remarried and his first partner was no longer available in the RePEAT survey, asking
him about his first marriage would increase the sample size of the study. However, the use of such male-
queried data was abandoned because for such female partners, other critical information (collected in
the education and demography sections that were used for existing household members only) is missing,




Females aged 24 to 49 years who had ever been married were asked whether their first
marriage partner agreed to pay any amount in some form of brideprice.9 The survey also
collected information about the characteristics of the first marriage and of the women in
their first marriage, such as the year of the marriage and whether the marriage was based
on love or arrangement.10 Furthermore, the survey asked about the respondent’s religion
and location of residence before and after the first marriage to identify any changes due
to the marriage.
To construct a variable measuring educational background, this study uses the survey
responses on the highest grade of education achieved by each individual. Comparing these
responses to the education system in Uganda, the minimum years of schooling required
to achieve the person’s highest grade of education is calculated. This variable is used as
the years of schooling throughout the paper.
9If the answer to this question was ‘yes’, then females were further asked about the amount of
brideprice agreed upon to be paid in cash, cattle, or other forms. Respondents were asked to value
cattle and other transfers in real terms (they were asked to report ‘how much would it cost to buy the
same amount of cattle (or other) now?’), and to report any cash payment in the nominal amount. This
approach was intended to suppress recall bias; however, the inflation adjustment turned out to be so
problematic that the cash amount was barely comparable to cattle and other brideprice amounts due to
rampant inflation rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when there was internal conflict in Uganda.
Therefore, the data on the value of brideprice payments are not used in this study.
10The survey attempted to collect information about the land holdings of the female’s natal family.
However, the variables contain too many missing values and thus cannot be used for analysis. Moreover,
the survey did not collect information about gift exchange and reciprocity.
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5 Estimation Strategy
5.1 Regression kink design estimation
In evaluating the impact of education on brideprice, it is important to note that the UPE
introduced free primary education to all those who were enroled in primary school in and
after 1997, regardless of their year of birth.11 Since older females were less likely to remain
enroled in primary schools in any given year, they were less likely to be exposed to the
reform. This aspect is clearly illustrated in Figure I, where the share of females who were
enroled in primary schools in 1997 is zero for cohorts born in or before 197812, whereas it is
increasing for younger cohorts born in or after 1979. This aspect is likely to have resulted
in a kinked increase in their years of education, which is likely to show accelerated growth
for younger females who were increasingly exposed to free primary education over a longer
period of time. We confirm this finding in Figure II, where educational attainment is
stable for females within the non-UPE-exposed cohorts (born in or before 1978), while
it exhibits a steady increase for females within the UPE-exposed cohorts (born in or
after 1979).13 Our aim is to exploit this kinked increase in the years of education to
causally estimate the effect of female education on brideprice transactions in Uganda.
The nature of the reform implies that the pattern of exposure is better characterized by
11In the original plan, up to four children per household were supposed to be the target of free primary
education. However, everyone was eventually provided with free primary education as long as they were
enroled in primary school (Grogan, 2008).
12The measurement of enrolment status in 1997 is based on a survey question that asked for the year
in which each person left primary education. In the survey, we asked about attendance at a UPE-funded
school and found quite a few females who reported having attended UPE-funded schools and having
already left their primary school by 1997. This fact may be due to misreporting, but it is more likely
that our question was simply misunderstood: we asked whether they attended a UPE-funded school
and did not clarify whether the school was free while they were enroled there. In this case, since the
UPE abolished tuition fees at all primary schools, females may have been confused about this question,
particularly if they acquired some posterior knowledge about the nature of the UPE to answer our survey
question.
13The vertical line indicates the year 1979, our cutoff that divides the control and treatment cohorts
in our estimation described below. For details, see Section 5.2.
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regression kink design (RKD) estimation than by regression discontinuity design (RDD)
estimation, which has been used by previous studies (Keats, 2018; Behrman, 2015). While
the existence of a jump in the share of females exposed to the reform, or in the years of
education, is a necessary condition for the RDD estimation, the figures also fail to exhibit
such a jump at the cutoffs proposed by previous studies (1983 in Keats (2018) and 1984
in Behrman 2015).
[Figures I and II about here]
Based on these considerations, we employ fuzzy RKD (FRKD) estimation, which
takes the years of education as the treatment variable and the year of birth as the running
variable.14 Let y be a generic outcome, s be the years of education, z be the year of birth,
and c be the cutoff. Then, the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) parameter in the FRKD,



























where the change in the first-order derivative of the conditional expectation of the out-
come at the cutoff is evaluated by the change in the first-order derivative of the conditional
expectation of the years of education.
To obtain the estimate of the TOT parameter, we follow the literature (Lundqvist
et al., 2014; Manoli and Turner, 2014; Tirgil et al., 2018) and estimate the following
14It would be ideal if we had more precise measurements, such as date of birth. However, birth year
is the most precise measure in our data.
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model by two-stage least squares regression, specified as follows:
yi = α0 + α(zi − c) + βŝi +Wiφ+ ui (2)
si = γ0 + γ(zi − c) + δI{zi ≥ c}(zi − c) +Wiψ + vi (3)
where I{A} denotes an indicator function that takes the value of one if condition A in
the following bracket holds and zero otherwise, ŝi denotes the predicted years of educa-
tion from equation (3), and W denotes premarital controls. This two-equation model
is estimated for females of h cohorts below and above the cutoff, c. The parameter β
represents the parametric analogue of the TOT parameter, τ , based on the assumption
that the conditional expectation functions of y and s are linearly specified.15 For statisti-
cal inference, we compute the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and perform the
usual two-sided significance test.16
5.2 Identification assumptions and the choice of cutoff
The identification of β hinges upon the exogeneity of the introduction of the UPE, which
in this case is that Ugandan females could not precisely manipulate whether they attended
a UPE-funded school (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). This condition is likely to be met in our
setting for the following two reasons.
First, the results of the presidential election preceding the introduction of the UPE
15As in Ashraf et al. (2020), we considered using additional exogenous variation to compare females
from ethnicities with and without the historical practice of brideprice. However, we abandoned the use
of such information after merging the historical data of the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967) and its
updates (Gray, 1999), since all the ethnic groups in our data (except for non-Uganda nationals) have
had a substantial amount of brideprice payments in the past, as shown in Appendix Table B.1.
16According to the extant literature, everyone enroled in primary school was the beneficiary of UPE,
which suggests that exposure to UPE is equivalent to leaving primary school in or after 1997. We do not
use this information explicitly in the estimation, primarily because it changes the research question—
from examining the effect of a one-year increase in female schooling on the cultural practice of brideprice
to that of UPE exposure— at the expense of richer information on treatment intensity.
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were ex ante uncertain. In 1996, along with the incumbent Yoweri Museveni, two other
candidates were running for presidential office: Paul Ssemogerere and Kibirige Mayanja.
Although Museveni ultimately won over three times more votes than any other candi-
dates, he lost in quite a few districts in the northern region and in some in the central and
eastern regions to the second-place candidate, Ssemogererere (Uganda Electoral Commis-
sion, 1996). Moreover, Museveni’s then slogan of anti-multiparty politics was said to be
unpopular (The Independent, 1996). Given the limited information network and coverage
in Uganda in 1996, it is unlikely that even those voters who supported Museveni in his
winning constituencies were able to predict his popularity in other places, let alone his
overall victory in the race. In addition, there was another election in June 1996 for the
members of Parliament.17 These two elections within a year are likely to have created
large uncertainty over the subsequent politics of Uganda.
Second, President Museveni was said to be reluctant to implement the UPE, and
he arguably placed a larger emphasis on infrastructure development in his economic
development planning. Furthermore, the government as a whole, and not just the newly
elected president, showed little to no interest in pursuing the removal of primary school
tuition, despite the call for it by international society (Stasavage, 2005). All these facts
support that the reform was indeed suddenly introduced.18
To strengthen the validity of this identifying assumption, we choose 1979 as the cutoff
17Large national projects such as the UPE usually require approval by Parliament in regard to the
budget and implementation plan. Thus, Museveni’s victory in the presidential election would have been
insufficient to put the UPE into practice.
18Museveni’s manifesto (Museveni, 1996a) states that he was planning to initiate a reform to allow
parents to send four children per household to school for free in 1997. However, 1997 was noted only in
the written manifesto: it was never addressed in his oral speech (Museveni, 1996b). That is, information
on the timing of the UPE introduction was available only to those who were literate and able to obtain
a copy of his manifesto or those who were in touch with someone who could read the manifesto. The
proportion of the politically literate in our rural sample data is likely to be small, judging from the
fact that the government launched a massive political campaign to publicize the UPE reform after its
announcement in December 1996 (Grogan, 2008): if the reform had already been well known to the
public, then the government would not have needed such a massive campaign.
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for the year of birth, which is the threshold below which the share of females exposed to
the UPE is zero and above which it is increasing (Figure I). This cutoff choice is likely
to further increase the credibility of our identification, since with this cutoff, the average
years of education show a clear slope change and no level change (Figure II), which satisfies
the continuity assumption of the treatment variable in the RKD estimation (Card et al.,
2015).19 Additionally, compared to later years chosen by previous studies (Behrman,
2015; Keats, 2018), our cutoff raises the opportunity cost of schooling, which intuitively
is higher at an older age, when females could otherwise work as family labourers or for
wages outside of the household. The larger opportunity cost makes it more difficult for
females in the older cohorts to manipulatively remain enroled in primary school. In sum,
the sudden introduction of the UPE and our choice of cutoff are likely to validate our
identification.
Our identification may fail if the effect of UPE on brideprice practices is brought
about by any factor other than a change in female education in a kinked manner. One
such factor is male education, and the direction of the potential bias in the estimate of
β arising from the effect of UPE on male education is ambiguous. For instance, the bias
may be positive if males with greater educational attainments are more likely to offer
brideprices or pay a larger brideprice, as their natal family is likely to be wealthier or
they earn more in the labour market. Conversely, the bias may be negative if such males
have better negotiation skills and persuade the bride’s parents into a marriage with no
brideprice or a lower brideprice. However, as we discuss in Sections 6.4 and 6.5, UPE did
not significantly affect male education.
Our identification may also fail if this educational reform triggered reforms of other
19Specifically, Assumption 3a of Card et al. (2015) rules out the case in which the treatment variable
(years of education in our setting) has no level change at the cutoff.
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policies and legal systems related to brideprice practices. One possibility is the amend-
ment of the penal code that re-defined the defilement of youths under the age of eighteen,
which is the same as the legal marital age in Uganda. Specifically, this amendment ex-
tended the definition of defilement from having sexual intercourse with a girl aged 18
or younger to performing any sexual act with any person younger than 18 years of age
(Doya, 2017). However, the amendment of the penal code came into effect in 2007, when
females in our oldest treatment cohort were 28 years old and thus not subject to the
reform. Therefore, it is unlikely that our estimation exploiting the kink for cohorts born
in 1979 or later will fail due to this concern.
Another potential confounding reform is the marriage law, for which many bills have
been drafted and discussed since the Constitutional Court declared in 2004 that the laws
governing marriage and divorce were inconsistent with the Constitution adopted in 1995
(Okello, G. M. & Ors., v. Attorney General, 2004). Uganda Law Reform Commission
(2010) created the basis for a series of bills, including those in 2009, 2013, and 2017.
However, none of these bills has been put into effect to date, and thus, no major reform
has been made with regard to the marriage act. Therefore, these bills have had barely
any meaningful impact on the marriages in our data.20
6 Results
6.1 Descriptive analyses
Table I presents the summary statistics of the major variables from our data for the
older control group (born in or before 1978) and the younger treatment group (born in
20Similarly, policies pertaining to HIV and AIDS, such as condom provision and anti-stigma campaigns
(Tumushabe, 2006), are unlikely to have created a kinked relationship for cohorts born in our cutoff year
and contaminated our findings.
21
or after 1979). Panel A shows that the proportion of females from the Langi, an ethnic
group mostly in the northern region of Uganda, is larger in the treatment group than in
the control group. This finding may be related to the internal conflict in the 1980s and
1990s, but we do not have a clear explanation for these significant differences. Therefore,
dummies for the location of residence at age 7 and ethnicity are always included in our
regression analyses.
Panel B shows that the treatment females are indeed more educated than the control
females. The years of education increased by approximately two years on average, and
the treatment females enrolled in primary school at an earlier age and left school at an
older age than did the control females. The treatment females were more likely to repeat
at least one grade in primary school and to proceed to secondary and tertiary education.
[Table I about here]
Panel C presents a summary of marital characteristics. While the probability of having
ever married is lower for the younger treatment females, this is most likely because they
are younger than those in the control group.21 When we focused on those who had ever
married, the proportion of love marriages slightly decreased and that of local mating
increased. The share of females in a polygynous union shows a relatively large and
significant change between the treatment and control groups. Finally, we observe a large
change in brideprice practice. In particular, the proportion of females who had brideprice
paid for their first marriage was significantly lower for treatment females than for control
females.
21One potential concern is that brideprice payment is observed only for females who have ever married.
If the composition of females who have ever married is different for the older and younger cohorts, then
the treatment effect estimates of the observable variables for these females may be biased. However, we
find that marital age does not affect our regression results. Specifically, we limit the sample to those
women who married at age 24 or younger, since we can observe marriages that occurred below 24 years
of age for all the cohorts in our data. This approach may lead to endogenous sample selection, but even
so, it did not change our results and conclusions. For more detail, see Section 6.4.
22
Our key outcome variable, whether females had a brideprice paid for their marriage,
demonstrates a kink at the cutoff. Figure III plots the proportion of females who received
a brideprice for their first marriage and shows that the slope of the linear fit for the control
cohorts is almost flat, while a downward trend is found for the treatment cohorts, thereby
making a kink at the cutoff. This kink indicates that there may have been a behavioural
change in the cultural practice of brideprice. We investigate this more rigorously through
regression analyses.
[Figure III about here]
6.2 Tests for identification assumptions
The identification assumptions of the effect of female education on marriage and bride-
price payment behaviours imply that there exists no kink in the predetermined covariates
at the cutoff. Figures IVa to IVn show the trend of several premarital covariates, includ-
ing parental years of education, premarital religion, the region of residence when females
were seven years old, and major ethnicities. For most of these variables, we fail to find a
clear slope change at the cutoff. These observations are further confirmed in Appendix
Table B.2, where the slope change, expressed by the coefficient estimate of the interac-
tion term, I{Year of birth ≥ 1979} · (Year of birth − 1979), is insignificant across these
pretreatment covariates. The exceptions include a decrease in the share of females from
the central region and an increase in that from the northern region.22 Although these
significant changes are small in magnitude and not robust across bandwidths, we always
control for past residence and ethnicity in the following regression analyses.
22Correspondingly, we observe a small decrease in the share of Baganda females (Figure IVi), most of
whom are from the central region, and an increase in the shares of Langi and Acholi females (Figures
IVl and IVm, respectively), most of whom are from the northern region.
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[Figure IV about here]
Another important testable implication is whether the density of year of birth is
smooth around the cutoff of 1979. For our first check, we use the histogram shown in
Figure V. Due to the small sample size of each cohort, the distribution is relatively noisy.23
However, no noticeable sorting of density around the cutoff appears to be present. The
non-existence of sorting is further checked by the statistical test proposed by Frandsen
(2017), which detects sorting around the cutoff when the running variable is discrete.24
The results shown in Table II reveal that the running variable indeed has a smooth density
around our cutoff. The absence of skewed density is not surprising, since the cutoff is not
used for any administrative purpose for UPE exposure in practice.
[Figure V about here]
[Table II about here]
6.3 Main results
To more rigorously examine the impact of female education on brideprice, we now turn
to the regression analysis. Table III shows the estimated kink coefficient in the first-stage
equation (3). The interaction term, I{z ≥ 1979} · (z − 1979), generally has a positive
and significant coefficient estimate. For bandwidths of 8 years or longer, the F statistic
approaches or passes the usual rule-of-thumb value of 10. The positive coefficient is likely
to reflect the kink in the years of education at the cutoff, which increased only for the
treatment cohorts (Figure II), implying that the relationship between the year of birth
and years of education became positively steeper for the cohorts exposed to UPE.
23In Section 6.4, we show that our results are robust to this noise.
24The standard density test proposed by McCrary (2008) is inappropriate in our setting since this
method requires the running variable to be strictly continuous, while we use year of birth, which takes
integer values and is thus discrete (Frandsen, 2017).
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[Table III about here]
Table IV presents the estimated effect of female education on whether a brideprice was
paid at the first marriage. It shows that female education had a negative and significant
effect on the probability of having a brideprice paid for marriage. These estimates are
consistent with Figures II and III, suggesting that an increase in female education for
cohorts born in or after 1979 has led to a decrease in the brideprice receipt status for these
cohorts. The statistically significant estimates from Tables III and IV imply that being
born one year later increased female education by .19 to .26 years, which in turn decreased
the share of females with a brideprice payment for marriage by 1.9 to 2.8 percentage
points, respectively. For bandwidths shorter than 10 years, the coefficient estimates for
the treatment effect are insignificant but still negative. These results suggest that an
increase in female education led to a decline in receiving a brideprice for marriage.
[Table IV about here]
One could be concerned that the increased years of education may have changed the
marital characteristics that caused the decline in brideprice practice. Table V presents
the estimates of the treatment effect on marriage characteristics. We find in Panel A
that females with more years of education married at an older age, a finding consistent
with those of prior studies using data from Uganda (e.g., Masuda and Yamauchi 2018
and Keats 2018). This result raises the concern that age at marriage may bias our main
estimates through a potentially differential marriage probability. We therefore conduct a
robustness check by limiting the sample of females to only those who married at younger
ages and confirm the robustness of our main findings. For details, see Section 6.4.
[Table V about here]
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In contrast, Panels B and C show that the levels of love marriage and local mating did
not change much due to female education. The significant estimate for love marriage with
a bandwidth of 11 years is likely to be just by chance, as Figure VI shows no substantial
kink in its trend at the cutoff. The share of polygynous unions shows a decrease over
the years according to the summary statistics (Table I), but Panel D shows null effect
estimates. Figure VII shows a consistent downward trend in polygynous marriage with
no kink at the cutoff. The long-term decline in the presence of polygyny is consistent with
previous studies reporting the negative linkage between education and polygyny (Tertilt
(2005), with an equilibrium model, and Fenske (2015), with empirical evidence).25 In
Panel E, the estimates for the non-divorcee indicator are all small in magnitude and
insignificant.26 These findings suggest that the change in brideprice receipt for females
with more years of education is unlikely due to a change in marital characteristics.
[Figures VI and VII about here]
6.4 Robustness checks and additional analyses
Our analysis is intended to reveal the effect of female education on brideprice payment
practices, exploiting free primary education in Uganda as the source of exogenous vari-
ation. However, it is possible that males, not just females, benefited from the UPE and
that highly educated males accumulated more wealth to pay to their brides’ families for
marriage. Alternatively, it is also possible that such males develop better negotiation
skills and persuade the brides’ parents to agree to a lower brideprice. These possibilities
imply that our estimation may identify the mixed effect of male and female education
25The dummy for polygamy concerns the current marital union and, thus, may not necessarily indicate
that the first marriage was polygynous, which is a limitation of our data.
26The divorce status may be right-censored, which is another limitation of our data.
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instead of the effect of only female education. To examine this implication, we repeat the
first-stage regression for males with our RePEAT data. The results in Appendix Table
B.5 show that UPE did not affect the educational attainments of males: in particular, the
point estimates are generally small and insignificant throughout, which is consistent with
Keats (2018), who found that male education did not respond to the Ugandan UPE, and
with Deininger (2003) and Nishimura et al. (2008), who reported lesser impacts of UPE
on male education. This finding supports our identification exploiting UPE to estimate
the effects of female education on brideprice practices and marital behaviours.
Additionally, our specification of estimation equations may introduce bias into the
estimated effect of female education. In particular, our identification may fail if there
exists a discontinuous jump at the cutoff27 or non-linearity in the expectation function
of brideprice payment practice.28 Appendix Table B.6 shows that our main findings
are robust to allow for a discontinuous jump at the cutoff.29 In addition, Appendix
Table B.7 shows that the regression equation is better specified as a linear, rather than
quadratic, function based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC).30 Furthermore, the
main findings are nearly unchanged when the regression equations are estimated using the
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) method (Hayashi, 2000), whose results
27Card et al. (2015) shows that if there is a discontinuity in the conditional expectation function, the
identification of the TT parameter in the RKD framework fails.
28The linear specification in the RKD estimation may spuriously produce a significant treatment effect
when the underlying true model is a smooth function that continuously changes its slope around the
cutoff.
29To allow for a potential jump at the cutoff, we estimate the following equations:
yi = α0 + α1(zi − c) + βŝi +Wiφ+ ui
si = γ0 + γ1(zi − c) + I{zi ≥ c}[δ0 + δ1(zi − c)] +Wiψ + vi.
30Specifically, we compare the AIC from the estimation of the following two reduced-form equations:
yi = γ0 + γ1(zi − c) + δ1I{zi ≥ c}(zi − c) +Wiφ+ ri, and
yi = γ0 + γ1(zi − c) + γ2(zi − c)2 + I{zi ≥ c}[δ1(zi − c) + δ2(zi − c)2] +Wiψ + ri.
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are shown in Appendix Table B.8. Therefore, it is unlikely that our main results are
severely affected by the specification assumptions or finite sample bias.
Alternatively, one may be concerned that our choice of cutoff is invalid and that
those used by previous studies, such as 1983 (Keats, 2018) or 1984 (Behrman, 2015),
are preferable. Figures I and II show that the kinks in the probability of exposure to
the UPE, as well as in the years of education, started in 1979 in our dataset. If we use
later years as the cutoff, then we expect that the first-stage kink will be estimated to
be smaller and potentially insignificant, which could make the treatment effect estimate
more imprecise and unstable. The estimated results using 1983 as the cutoff in Appendix
Table B.9 are in line with this view, showing insignificant coefficient estimates for the first
stage and the treatment effect. The point estimates are also inflated, which is likely due
to the weak first-stage estimates. These results indicate that it is important to choose
the year at which the increasing exposure to free education started.
Furthermore, Figure V shows that the density of the year of birth is somewhat noisy,
which may arise from misreporting and possibly bias the treatment effect estimate. The
drop in the density for the year of birth of 1981 may be particularly worrisome.31 To
address this concern, we re-estimate the model by excluding each of the birth cohorts
within the bandwidth. The results, partly reported in Appendix Figures A.2a to A.2d,
show that the estimated effects and their confidence intervals are robust to such sample
restriction.32 Similarly, the change in the composition of females between the treatment
and control cohorts in terms of factors such as ethnicity and region of residence at age
seven may affect our main estimates if they are inadequately controlled for. To address
this issue, we re-estimate the effects by excluding the Langi females and those who lived
31The density test also suggests that the year of birth of 1981 may raise the concern of potential
sorting, although the policy or survey design does not provide any incentive for manipulative reporting.
32The results for other bandwidths are not shown for brevity but are available upon request.
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in the northern region at age seven. The results are reported in Appendix Table B.10 and
show that our main estimates are robust. Some might also be worried that the fluctuations
in parental education and own pre-marital religion (Figures IVa through IVd) may bias
our main estimates, but controlling for them does not alter our main findings (Appendix
Tables B.11 and B.12).33 These results suggest that the noise in the density of the year
of birth, as well as the predetermined covariates, are unlikely to drive our estimates.
The potential confounding effect of the legal trial against brideprice practice in Uganda
is worth noting. Specifically, some in Uganda have criticized brideprice practice, claiming
that such a culture, combined with virilocality, may dehumanize females, referring to
the payment of brideprice as treating females as a ‘commodity ’ (Wendo, 2004; MIFUMI
Project, 2009). If such a social debate confounds the estimation of the effect of female
education, then it should only affect the marriage of females in the treatment cohorts in
an intensifying manner. However, this result is unlikely because such a debate cannot
affect only the marriage of females born in or after the cutoff year of 1979. Furthermore,
even when we allow for a differential trend of brideprice payment for females who married
in or after 2007,34 which is the year in which the trial against brideprice practice was
initiated, the estimated negative effect of female education remains essentially unchanged
(Appendix Table B.13).35
One might also be concerned about a possible general equilibrium effect. That is,
33Specifically, we include the years of education of the bride’s mother, father, both of them, and
pre-marital religion dummies linearly in the covariate vector W of equations (2) and (3). However, if
we simply estimate the model, the sample size used for estimation with parental education is reduced
substantially due to missing values for these variables. Therefore, we present results from a specification
with an indicator for whether these variables are missing.
34Specifically, we estimate the following equations:
yi = α0 + α1(zi − c) + βŝi + θ0mi + I{mi ≥ 2007}(θ1 + θ2mi) +Wiφ+ ui
si = γ0 + γ1(zi − c) + δI{zi ≥ c}(zi − c) + ρ0mi + I{mi ≥ 2007}(ρ1 + ρ2mi) +Wiψ + vi
where mi denotes the year in which female i married.
35The finding of little to no confounding due to the social debate is in line with anecdotes from surveyed
females, who told us that they were unaware of either the debate or the court case.
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the UPE might have increased the share of educated females in the marriage and labour
markets and decreased the returns to education. This decline in returns to education,
in turn, might have reduced the incentives for grooms to pay brideprice to marry better
educated females. However, this is unlikely to be entirely driving our results, since the
magnitude of the increase in female education does not seem so large as to completely
change the composition of females in the marriage market. In our data, the average
number of years of schooling only increased from five to seven over 13 years of our
treatment period. Additionally, past studies do not indicate a sudden reduction in the
returns to female education in recent years (e.g., Peet et al., 2015).36 These findings
from our data and the literature suggest that the general equilibrium effect is unlikely to
explain our finding of cultural change.
We further consider the potential selection in terms of marriage and censoring by
marital age. First, we examine whether the choice to marry is a result of increased female
education. Table B.3 shows the regression results for an indicator for having ever married
using all the females in our data, regardless of marital history.37 In Panel A, female
education is found to have a significant negative effect on marital probability. However,
Panel B shows that the estimates from a quadratic specification are much smaller and
insignificant when all bandwidths are available.38 Here, we present the results from the
quadratic model, since the AIC for the reduced-form regressions (Panel C) suggests that
the linear model is not always preferable to the quadratic model. Therefore, our data are
36Note that the attempt to interpret our finding of the negative effect of female education on the
probability of receiving brideprice as a result of a decline in returns to education implicitly assumes the
human capital compensation hypothesis, which predicts the amount of brideprice received by the bride’s
parents depends upon the returns to her education. However, we discuss in Section 6.5 that the human
capital compensation hypothesis cannot explain cultural decline.
37Correspondingly, Figure A.1 shows the share of married females in each cohort for all the females in
our data, regardless of marital history.
38The estimates from the quadratic model are less precise, as expected (Card et al., 2016; Gelman and
Imbens, 2019). However, the insignificance does not solely stem from the larger standard errors since
the point estimates are also considerably smaller.
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inconclusive regarding the possibility of selective marital behaviours.
Second, given this inconclusiveness, we examine whether the probability of brideprice
payment is a function of females’ marital age.39 In our data, the marital information
is censored at age 24 for the youngest cohort compared to age 49 for the oldest cohort
(when using the largest bandwidth of 13 years). When we replicate the regressions,
limiting the sample to those who married at the age of 24 or younger, the estimated
effects are strikingly similar to the main results, despite the potentially endogenous sample
restriction (Appendix Table B.4).40 This finding suggests that at least for females who
are already married, the effects of female education are not systematically different across
ages at marriage. Moreover, regardless of age at marriage, Table V shows that marital
characteristics are not systematically different for the younger treatment females and older
control females. Therefore, our findings on the effect of female education on brideprice
practice are unlikely to be substantially biased due to a potentially endogenous choice to
marry.
6.5 Mechanism through which female education reduces bride-
price practices
We have shown that an increase in female education reduces the probability of receiving a
brideprice for a first marriage. We have also shown that this cultural change does not seem
to have been caused by a change in marital behaviours. Based on our above findings, we
now examine the mechanism of the cultural change brought about by educational reform.
39For example, parents of younger females may be more likely to receive a brideprice if marital age is
linked to virginity, which may be valued in the marriage market (Ambrus et al., 2010), or the husband
may feel more obliged to pay a brideprice for a younger bride, as her natal family may require greater
compensation.
40The number of observations is close to the results in Table IV, suggesting that most females marry
at fairly young ages and are not actually subject to censoring.
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First, as we discuss in Section 2.1, the human capital compensation hypothesis sug-
gests that a brideprice is paid to compensate for a bride’s human capital (Becker, 1991;
Anderson, 2007). According to this hypothesis, to the extent that greater female educa-
tion implies a larger contribution to household production, parents who face a higher cost
when giving a daughter away receive a larger brideprice. For this hypothesis to explain
the decline in brideprice practice, either female education or the returns to it should
have declined. However, we find that Ugandan females exposed to UPE increased their
educational attainments, and the literature does not suggest a drop in returns to female
education over our analysis cohorts (Peet et al., 2015).41
One might also be concerned that, according to the human capital compensation
hypothesis, the control cohorts whose education was relatively low would appear less
attractive in the marriage market and thus be paid less. If this tendency is strong,
they might have received no brideprice, and our effect estimates may be attenuated.
When estimating the main model excluding females from the control cohorts born in
years close to the cutoff, the point estimates become slightly larger in magnitude but
the differences are virtually imperceptible (Appendix Table B.15). Given that female
education attainment and returns to female education do not seem to have declined, that
the spillover effect seems to be minimal, if it exists at all, and that the attenuation bias
would not reverse the conclusion, we deem the human capital compensation hypothesis
unlikely to explain the whole cultural change.
Second, the assortative matching hypothesis suggests that educated women are more
41In addition, we test one of the predictions of human capital compensation theory by estimating the
effect of female education on the probability of females having non-agricultural jobs. The estimated effects
are small and insignificant, as shown in Table B.14. Strictly speaking, the effect of female education on
female employment should arise from the husband’s ex ante expectation at marriage, while the analysis
here is concerned with the ex post self-report by females at the time of the survey. The measurement
may thus be inaccurate, which is a limitation of our data.
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likely to marry educated men, who can afford to pay a higher brideprice. For this theory
to account for the decline in brideprice practice, the correlation between females and their
partners’ education needs to have weakened. However, the simple correlation coefficient of
women’s own and their partners’ years of education became larger (0.408) for the younger
treated females than for the older control females (0.312). More rigorously, we regress
partners’ years of education on the indicator for being born in or after 1979, female
education, and their interaction term. The results in Appendix Table B.16 show that
on the one hand, female education is significantly correlated with a woman’s partner’s
education, indicating the existence of assortative matching. On the other hand, the
coefficient estimate for the interaction term is positive yet insignificant, suggesting that
the assortative nature of marital mating becomes neither stronger nor weaker for the
younger treated cohorts. These results show that the assortative matching hypothesis
cannot explain the decline in brideprice practice.
We now discuss an alternative hypothesis that can explain our findings. That is, more
education may have changed women’s perception of brideprice and led them to refuse to
receive a brideprice for marriage. Several studies have shown that women in Uganda are
worried about domestic violence and the sexual infidelity of those husbands who have
paid a brideprice (Wendo, 2004; Kaye et al., 2005; MIFUMI Project, 2009; Bishai and
Grossbard, 2010). Another study reports a higher probability of divorce for couples with
brideprice payments in Senegal (Platteau and Gaspart, 2007).42 In the media, articles on
violence related to brideprice have been reported even after the Supreme Court decision
in 2015.43 The expectation of domestic violence, differential extramarital affairs, and
divorce induced by the payment of a brideprice are likely to decrease the future utility
42While divorce, per se, may not be a bad outcome, given the differential treatment of men and women
after divorce (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005b), it may be the last resort for women.
43Examples include Daily Monitor (2016a,b, 2017, 2018a,b,c, 2019) and New Vision (2016a,b).
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of women. Then, their altruistic parents might become increasingly averse to receiving
a brideprice, as their daughters become more educated and more aware of these possible
drawbacks. In other words, the parents of educated females may choose their daughters’
sound future marital life at the expense of a wealth transfer in the form of a brideprice.
This interpretation is consistent with the findings of Gaspart and Platteau (2010), who
argue that an increase in female education may help daughters strengthen their influence
on their altruistic parents and persuade them to consider their daughters’ potential loss
of utility contingent on a large brideprice payment.
Our focus group discussions (FGDs) inviting selected surveyed females raise yet an-
other hypothesis.44 Females present at our FGDs generally agreed on important pre-
dictions of the model by Gaspart and Platteau (2010). For instance, the presence of
brideprice may lock up the bride in a marriage where she is not treated well (e.g., with
intense domestic violence by the husband); female education is associated with a larger
brideprice but also with marriages involving no brideprice payment; and it is positively
associated with the outside option and the probability of divorce. However, the women
disagreed with one of the critical predictions of the study by saying that females with more
education, if they want to marry with no brideprice at all, would ask their husband not
to pay brideprice, rather than ask their parents not to receive it. Additionally, our field
observation found that an increasing number of females decide who and when to marry,
with no parental consent at all, on top of the large share of females who marry a man
based on love (approximately 90%, Table I). These findings from our FGDs suggest that,
if the presence of brideprice payment increases domestic violence and other maltreatment
of females within marriage, rejecting the brideprice payment is likely to increase female
44We conducted three FGDs in three selected villages in Eastern and Central Uganda in March 2020.
Our FGDs accommodated six to eight females who were among the survey subjects.
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utility.45 In addition, it is likely to lower the cost of divorce, as the brideprice serves as
debt. Thus, if female education increases female bargaining power, it may then decrease
marriages with brideprice payment. This hypothesis can explain the decline in brideprice
practice as a result of an increase in female education, even if education brings no change
in parents’ altruism toward their daughters.
These possible mechanisms—parental altruism and female bargaining—may sound
unique to Uganda, where there has been a social debate on whether brideprice practice
should be banned (Wendo, 2004; MIFUMI Project, 2009). However, as discussed by
Anderson (2007), the practice has declined or is declining in areas where such a societal
discourse does not seem intense or the contemporary concept of human rights has not yet
fully developed. Even in Uganda, quite a few females in our FGDs were unaware of either
the debate or the law suit. Moreover, our results show that the presence of concern about
the legitimacy of brideprice practice does not confound our estimate of the negative effect
of female education (see section 6.4 and Appendix Table B.13). It would be interesting
to investigate whether a similar impact on brideprice practice is found in other settings
of female education.
As Gaspart and Platteau (2010) mention, our proposed hypotheses do not rule out the
assortative matching mechanism or the human capital compensation motive for brideprice
payment. Rather, these hypotheses and our interpretations based on parental altruism
or intramarital bargaining can coexist. That is, conventional theories postulate that the
amount of brideprice is endogenously determined as a function of female education, as-
45For instance, if we slightly modify the settings in Gaspart and Platteau (2010), the payoff of a
marrying female may be written as U = (1−S)(Y −D×V )+S(W −D×B), where S is an indicator for
separation or divorce, Y denotes household production, V is disutility from domestic violence, W is her
outside option, D is an indicator of the presence of a brideprice payment, and B is the amount of the
brideprice. Assuming V,B > 0, the presence of a brideprice payment decreases her payoff both within
and outside of marriage. This is because brideprice is assumed to be associated with domestic violence
within marriage and it becomes a debt to the husband once marriage falls apart.
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suming that whether to pay brideprice is exogenously determined. Our hypotheses call
for an extension such that the presence of brideprice payment also be determined endoge-
nously as a function of female education. Put differently, a more comprehensive model
of the marriage market that features brideprice payment would separate the decision on
whether to pay brideprice from how much to pay as brideprice and endogenise both of
them with respect to female education. Such an overarching framework may seamlessly
unify the several proposed mechanisms in the literature and provide conditions that de-
termine which effects—the effects of female education on the amount and practice of
brideprice—dominate in which cases, thereby explaining the cultural decline in relation
to an expansion of female education during economic development. It would be fruitful
for future study to theoretically analyse a comprehensive model and empirically test its
validity.
7 Conclusion
Many developed countries used to have a brideprice practice and witnessed its decline,
while some less developed countries are in the middle of a cultural change. Economic
development has been identified as a closely related factor, but little is known about
exactly what contributes to the decline of brideprice practices. In this study, we utilise a
natural experiment in Uganda and provide the first evidence that an expansion of female
education leads to a decline in this cultural practice. Our estimation results show that
a year increase in female education reduces the probability of brideprice payment by
approximately 10 to 12 percentage points. To the best of our knowledge, this finding is
the first evidence of its kind in the economic literature on brideprice.
As a potential mechanism for cultural change, we first considered that conventional hy-
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potheses, namely, the human capital compensation and assortative matching hypotheses,
are unlikely to fully explain cultural change. We have, therefore, discussed two alterna-
tive conjectures. One relates the cultural decline to parental altruism toward marrying
daughters: altruistic parents may give up the brideprice transfer and opt for a higher
expected marital utility for their daughters, since doing so is likely to reduce the chance
of bind their daughter in a marriage in which she is ill-treated. Another focuses on the
relative bargaining power in the marital union: brides with more education may have
greater bargaining power and convince grooms to marry without a brideprice payment.
Finally, our study is not free of limitations. First, our proposed conjectures on the
mechanism through which female education affects brideprice practice await theoretical
formalisation and empirical examination. Similarly, our finding on the negative effect
of female education on brideprice practice needs to be tested for external validity. An
increase in the human capital of females is a common phenomenon during economic
development and is thus likely to have contributed to cultural change in many countries.
It would therefore be beneficial to investigate whether similar changes have occurred
in other countries that have experienced major educational reforms and to identify the
mechanisms for which such changes took place.
Second, our study does not deny the existence of other mechanisms that may also play
a role in the decline in brideprice culture. It is possible that the cultural decline reported
worldwide (Anderson, 2007) may have also been facilitated for reasons other than an
increase in female education. Studies exploring these other mechanisms would thus enrich
understanding of the transformation of brideprice practice. Third, our estimation results
are relevant only for cohorts born in years in the small neighbourhood of the cutoff. The
findings would be different if the cultural behaviour farther away from the cutoff cohort
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is considered. It would be fruitful for future research to overcome these challenges and
explore the impact of institutional reforms on cultural changes, particularly brideprice
practice.
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Share of females enrolled in primary school in/after 1997
Notes. This figure plots the share of females in each birth cohort of the females aged 24 to 49 who have
ever married and were enrolled in primary school in and after 1997. The enrolment status is based on
the question about the years in which each female enrolled and left primary school rather than on the
self-reported measure of their UPE receipt.







1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Years of education
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Notes. This figure plots the average years of education of females born in each year and its linear fit for
females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married. Years of education are defined as the minimum years of
schooling required to achieve the highest grade of education reported by the respondent. The dashed
vertical line represents the year 1979, the cutoff of our analysis, as explained in detail in Section 5.2.





1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
1 if paid brideprice
Notes. This figure shows the share of females who agreed to a brideprice payment for their first marriage
for each birth cohort and its linear fit. The dashed vertical line represents the year 1979, the cutoff of
our analysis, as explained in detail in Section 5.2.
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Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Father's years of education
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Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Mother's years of education





1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Religion before marriage: christian





1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Religion before marriage: muslim
(d) Share of females who were Muslim prior to marriage.







1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Region of residence at age 7: East








1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Region of residence at age 7: Central







1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Region of residence at age 7: West






1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Region of residence at age 7: North
(h) Share of females who lived in the northern region at age seven.







1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Ethnicity: Baganda
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Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Ethnicity: Basoga






1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Ethnicity: Banyankore






1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Ethnicity: Langi
(l) Share of females whose ethnicity is Langi.
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Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Ethnicity: Acholi
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Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Ethnicity: Others
(n) Share of females whose ethnicity is any other.













1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Distribution of Year of Birth
Notes. This figure shows a histogram of the year of birth for those females aged 24 to 49 who have ever
married. The dashed vertical line represents the year 1979, the cutoff of our analysis, as explained in
detail in Section 5.2.





1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Marriage based on love
Notes. This figure shows the share of females whose first marriage was based on love and its linear fit
for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married.





1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Current marital status: polygamous
Notes. This figure shows the share of females whose current marital union is polygynous and its linear
fit for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married. Polygyny is a type of marital union in which one
male marries more than one female.
Figure VII: Share of females whose current marital union is polygynous.
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Tables.
Table I: Summary Statistics of the Major Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample Females born in 1966 - 1978. Females born in 1979 - 1991. (2) = (6)
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. t statistic
Panel A. Demographic characteristics.
Age 523 42.71 43 3.62 733 29.71 30 3.84 -60.57***
Region at age 7: Eastern 468 0.387 0 0.488 662 0.361 0 0.481 -0.88
Region at age 7: Central 468 0.235 0 0.424 662 0.248 0 0.432 0.49
Region at age 7: Western 468 0.259 0 0.438 662 0.210 0 0.408 -1.91*
Region at age 7: Northern 468 0.118 0 0.322 662 0.169 0 0.375 2.41**
Own ethnicity: Baganda 504 0.177 0 0.382 702 0.168 0 0.374 -0.39
Own ethnicity: Basoga 504 0.129 0 0.335 702 0.117 0 0.321 -0.64
Own ethnicity: Banyankore 504 0.117 0 0.322 702 0.101 0 0.302 -0.88
Own ethnicity: Langi 504 0.069 0 0.254 702 0.110 0 0.313 2.38**
Own ethnicity: Acholi 504 0.077 0 0.267 702 0.088 0 0.284 0.68
Own ethnicity: Any other 504 0.431 0 0.496 702 0.416 0 0.493 -0.51
Panel B. Education variables.
Years of education 514 4.449 5 3.305 719 6.439 6 4.003 9.24***
Partner’s years of education 433 6.367 6 3.603 477 6.964 7 3.549 -2.52**
Primary: 1 if attended in any grade 514 0.790 1 0.408 719 0.894 1 0.308 5.12***
Primary: Age of enrolment 341 7.639 7 1.500 587 7.305 7 1.567 -3.18***
Primary: Age of leaving school 321 9.330 12 8.302 517 11.53 13 6.440 4.30***
Secondary: 1 if attended in any grade 514 0.123 0 0.328 719 0.300 0 0.459 7.52***
Tertiary: 1 if attended in any grade 514 0.008 0 0.088 719 0.061 0 0.240 4.82***
(Continues to the next page)
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Table I: Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Females born in 1966 - 1978. Females born in 1979 - 1991. (2) = (6)
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. t statistic
Panel C. First marriage variables.
1 if ever married 521 0.946 1 0.226 731 0.776 1 0.417 -8.49***
Age at first marriage 465 17.66 18 4.746 535 17.90 18 4.064 0.87
1 if love marriage 474 0.928 1 0.258 532 0.898 1 0.302 -1.67*
Own pre-marital residence: Within LC1 475 0.236 0 0.425 535 0.290 0 0.454 1.94*
Own pre-marital residence: Within subcounty 475 0.251 0 0.434 535 0.245 0 0.430 -0.21
Own pre-marital residence: Within district 475 0.208 0 0.407 535 0.200 0 0.400 -0.33
Own pre-marital residence: Within Uganda 475 0.303 0 0.460 535 0.252 0 0.435 -1.80*
Own pre-marital religion: Christian 474 0.903 1 0.296 533 0.889 1 0.314 -0.71
Own pre-marital religion: Muslim 474 0.095 0 0.293 533 0.111 0 0.314 0.82
1 if current = first marriage 399 0.802 1 0.399 463 0.840 1 0.367 1.46
1 if in polygynous union 521 0.184 0 0.388 731 0.115 0 0.319 -3.46***
1 if brideprice paid 471 0.743 1 0.437 528 0.621 1 0.486 -4.15***
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology survey in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the summary statistics
(number of observations (N), mean, median, and standard deviation) of the major variables for the sample women who were born from 1966 to 1991.
The control group consists of females born from 1966 to 1978, while the treatment group consists of females born from 1979 to 1991. The age of leaving
primary school was asked of those who were born in 1972 or after and had completed at least some primary education.
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Table II: Density Test of Year of Birth.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Smoothing parameter (k)
Year of birth 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.10
1967 0.961 1.000 1.000 1.000
1968 0.634 0.830 0.836 0.777
1969 0.179 0.172 0.188 0.234
1970 0.014 0.025 0.030 0.047
1971 0.070 0.069 0.079 0.113
1972 0.050 0.079 0.088 0.121
1973 0.346 0.331 0.349 0.450
1974 0.385 0.384 0.400 0.447
1975 0.065 0.089 0.103 0.138
1976 0.443 0.460 0.478 0.523
1977 0.442 0.551 0.565 0.600
1978 0.185 0.178 0.194 0.241
1979 0.891 0.861 0.934 0.941
1980 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
1981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1982 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1983 0.029 0.028 0.035 0.058
1984 0.868 1.000 1.000 1.000
1985 0.341 0.464 0.483 0.483
1986 0.650 0.645 0.657 0.694
1987 0.577 0.698 0.709 0.735
1988 0.502 0.499 0.512 0.556
1989 0.983 1.000 1.000 1.000
1990 0.045 0.066 0.076 0.104
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and
Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the
results of a density test proposed by Frandsen (2017) for the
year of birth of females in our dataset. A smaller parameter
value of k ∈ [0, 1] makes the test stricter, where the null hy-
pothesis is that there is no manipulative sorting of the run-
ning variable at the cutoff. The computation uses females
aged 24 to 49 who have ever married.
53
Table III: Estimated results of first-stage regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Years of education
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} 0.187*** 0.198*** 0.253*** 0.256*** 0.375*** 0.369*** 0.244 0.542*** 0.577** 0.597 0.495
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.059) (0.067) (0.075) (0.091) (0.105) (0.124) (0.152) (0.201) (0.250) (0.365) (0.672)
Year of birth - 1979 0.032 0.024 -0.009 -0.003 -0.066 -0.045 0.020 -0.134 -0.209 -0.125 -0.100
(0.031) (0.036) (0.042) (0.048) (0.054) (0.065) (0.077) (0.104) (0.130) (0.183) (0.280)
Observations 894 847 776 708 651 572 504 426 364 301 206
R-squared 0.261 0.260 0.258 0.259 0.272 0.272 0.288 0.327 0.348 0.365 0.508
F statistics 9.895 8.853 11.41 7.962 12.82 8.887 2.565 7.276 5.314 2.682 0.54
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the coefficient estimate of the interaction between
the year of birth minus the cutoff of 1979 and an indicator for it being equal to or larger than the cutoff from the regression of female years of education. Reported in
parentheses are standard errors robust for heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. The F statistic
for the significance of the coefficient for the interaction term is reported in each panel. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the
dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and were born in
years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table IV: The Estimated Impact on Brideprice Receipt Probability with All Available Bandwidths.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth. 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
1 if brideprice paid -0.099** -0.123** -0.110** -0.109** -0.031 -0.040 -0.081 -0.031 -0.039 -0.082 -0.393
(0.051) (0.055) (0.048) (0.056) (0.035) (0.046) (0.089) (0.044) (0.056) (0.090) (0.588)
Observations 878 832 762 695 640 562 495 417 356 294 201
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect estimate for
the probability of receiving brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data. Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroscedas-
ticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth
minus the cutoff, and the dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49
who have ever married and were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table V: The Estimated Impact of Female Education on Marital Characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel A. Age at marriage
Treatment effect 0.761** 0.684** 0.456 0.438 0.254 -0.347 -1.643 -0.213 -0.426 -0.556 0.130
(0.362) (0.389) (0.358) (0.433) (0.369) (0.468) (1.456) (0.524) (0.621) (0.896) (1.455)
Observations 879 834 764 698 644 567 499 422 361 298 204
Panel B. 1 if love marriage
Treatment effect 0.027 0.027 0.043** 0.033 0.018 0.009 -0.013 -0.023 -0.056* -0.092 0.020
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.043) (0.028) (0.040) (0.072) (0.094)
Observations 886 839 770 703 648 570 502 424 362 300 206
Panel C. 1 if living in premarital LC1
Treatment effect 0.056 0.029 0.012 0.021 0.008 -0.012 -0.026 -0.029 0.014 0.076 -0.005
(0.045) (0.043) (0.038) (0.042) (0.033) (0.039) (0.071) (0.043) (0.054) (0.086) (0.175)
Observations 889 842 771 705 648 569 501 424 362 299 205
Panel D. 1 if polygyny
Treatment effect 0.009 -0.010 -0.026 -0.007 0.008 0.013 -0.022 -0.019 0.003 -0.005 -0.053
(0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038) (0.031) (0.037) (0.064) (0.035) (0.042) (0.054) (0.125)
Observations 894 847 776 708 651 572 504 426 364 301 206
Panel E. 1 if not divorced
Treatment effect -0.015 -0.048 -0.047 -0.046 -0.021 -0.013 -0.054 -0.015 -0.036 -0.015 -0.021
(0.040) (0.046) (0.044) (0.049) (0.030) (0.035) (0.056) (0.037) (0.046) (0.041) (0.067)
Observations 755 715 655 602 559 493 432 371 319 264 182
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the estimated treatment effect
of female education on marital characteristics. Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is de-
noted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies
for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and were
born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff. Due to missing values, the number of observations differs across regressions.
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year of birth
Cohort mean Linear fit Quadratic fit
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
1 if having ever married
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes:
This figure plots the share of females who have ever married for each birth cohort and the linear and
quadratic fit. The dashed vertical line represents the year 1979, the cutoff of our analysis, as explained
in detail in Section 5.2.














1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990
Birth Year of the Excluded Cohort
Estimated Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Excluding Each Cohort within the 13-Year Bandwidth
Effect of Female Education on Brideprice Receipt












1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990
Birth Year of the Excluded Cohort
Estimated Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Excluding Each Cohort within the 12-Year Bandwidth
Effect of Female Education on Brideprice Receipt

















1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990
Birth Year of the Excluded Cohort
Estimated Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Excluding Each Cohort within the 11-Year Bandwidth
Effect of Female Education on Brideprice Receipt













1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990
Birth Year of the Excluded Cohort
Estimated Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015.
Excluding Each Cohort within the 10-Year Bandwidth
Effect of Female Education on Brideprice Receipt
(d) Bandwidth = 10 years.
Source: Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes: These figures show the estimated effect of female education
on brideprice receipt status and its 95% confidence intervals for each bandwidth by excluding each of the birth cohorts from the estimation sample. The dashed
vertical line indicates the cutoff year of birth, 1979.
Figure A.2: Robustness check by excluding each of the birth cohorts within the bandwidths.
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Appendix B Additional tables.
Table B.1: Matching Ethnicity Codes to Murdock (1967) and Gray
(1999).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RePEAT Data Ethnographic Atlas Reference Brideprice practice
Acholi Luo O, S Yes
Alur Luo S Yes
Badama Luo J Yes
Bafumbira Rwanda-Rundi* E, W Yes
Baganda Ganda O, S Yes
Bagisu Gisu O, S Yes
Bagwere Soga E Yes
Bahororo Nyankole J, E Yes
Bakenyi Soga E Yes
Bakiga Nyankole E Yes
Bakonjo Nyoro E Yes
Banyankore Nyankole O, S Yes
Banyarwanda Rwanda-Rundi* W Yes
Banyole Gisu O Yes
Banyoro Nyoro O, S Yes
Baruli Soga E Yes
Barundi Rwanda-Rundi* W Yes
Basoga Soga O, S Yes
Batooro Nyoro O, S Yes
Iteso Teso S Yes
Jopadhola Luo S Yes
Karimojong Teso O, S Yes
Kuman Luo O Yes
Langi Lango O, S Yes
Samia Gisu W Yes
Sebei Kipsigis S Yes
Sabiny Kipsigis S, J Yes
Not Ugandan - - -
Notes. This table relates the ethnic groups that appear in this study’s data collected
from the Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology (RePEAT)
in Uganda in 2015 to the data from Ethnographic Atlas, first written by Murdock
(1967) and updated by Gray (1999). Column (3) indicates the source of informa-
tion that is used to match the names of ethnic groups in the RePEAT and Ethno-
graphic Atlas; O stands for Olson et al. (1996), S for Stokes (2009), J for the Joshua
Project (Retrieved on the 5th of July, 2019 at https://joshuaproject.net/), E for Eth-
nologue (retrieved on the 5th of July, 2019 at https://www.ethnologue.com/), and W
for Wikipedia. *Since the discussion still continues as to where the ethnic groups in
the area that is now contemporary Rwanda and Burundi come from, we assign a new
code, ‘Rwanda-Rundi’; this area traditionally employs brideprice practice according
to Wikipedia.
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Table B.2: Kink Coefficient Estimates from Regressions of Predetermined Covariates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel A. Father’s years of education
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} -0.058 -0.028 0.095 0.166 0.122 0.189 0.189 0.254 0.055 -0.315 -1.467*
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.085) (0.093) (0.108) (0.118) (0.136) (0.161) (0.205) (0.296) (0.395) (0.446) (0.882)
Observations 689 655 604 557 514 452 395 330 278 237 159
R-squared 0.020 0.024 0.022 0.031 0.016 0.017 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.021
Panel B. Mother’s years of education
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} -0.016 0.012 0.073 0.133 0.145 0.214 0.270 0.408* 0.155 0.164 -0.624
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.068) (0.076) (0.087) (0.099) (0.115) (0.140) (0.170) (0.245) (0.308) (0.398) (0.645)
Observations 716 678 625 572 528 464 408 336 281 238 155
R-squared 0.025 0.028 0.030 0.037 0.029 0.037 0.034 0.016 0.007 0.002 0.006
Panel C. Pre-marital religion: Christian
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} 0.010* 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.014 0.024* 0.022 0.047** 0.024 0.084*
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.031) (0.048)
Observations 1007 953 878 804 737 648 576 481 411 344 234
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.010
Panel D. Pre-marital religion: Muslim
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} -0.009* -0.008 -0.009 -0.011 -0.007 -0.014 -0.023* -0.022 -0.047** -0.026 -0.095**
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.031) (0.047)
Observations 1007 953 878 804 737 648 576 481 411 344 234
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.016 0.005 0.012
(Continues to the next page)
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Table B.2: Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel E. Premarital region of residence: Eastern
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.014 -0.037** -0.018 0.006 0.027 0.015 -0.168**
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027) (0.035) (0.046) (0.076)
Observations 944 892 818 748 688 605 536 455 388 322 221
R-squared 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.033
Panel F. Premarital region of residence: Central
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} -0.018** -0.016** -0.017* -0.013 -0.002 0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.017 0.003 0.084
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) (0.040) (0.079)
Observations 944 892 818 748 688 605 536 455 388 322 221
R-squared 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.013
Panel G. Premarital region of residence: Western
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} 0.010 0.012 0.006 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.004 -0.037* -0.037 -0.053 -0.049
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.029) (0.038) (0.072)
Observations 944 892 818 748 688 605 536 455 388 322 221
R-squared 0.009 0.013 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.002
Panel H. Premarital region of residence: Northern
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} 0.016*** 0.016** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.021* 0.033** 0.038* 0.048* 0.137**
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.055)
Observations 944 892 818 748 688 605 536 455 388 322 221
R-squared 0.019 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.034
(Continues to the next page)
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Table B.2: Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel I. Ethnicity: Baganda
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} -0.015** -0.015** -0.015** -0.010 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 0.012 -0.014 0.007 0.0584
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.025) (0.034) (0.067)
Observations 1,016 962 887 812 746 656 584 489 418 350 238
R-squared 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.008
Panel J. Ethnicity: Basoga
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} 0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.005 0.005 -0.002 0.007 0.023 0.022 -0.003 -0.061
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024) (0.029) (0.042)
Observations 1,016 962 887 812 746 656 584 489 418 350 238
R-squared 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.007
Panel K. Ethnicity: Banyankore
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} 0.004 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.012 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 0.035
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020) (0.025) (0.047)
Observations 1,016 962 887 812 746 656 584 489 418 350 238
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005
Panel L. Ethnicity: Langi
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} 0.013** 0.012** 0.015** 0.013* 0.013 0.005 -0.003 -0.007 0.005 0.028 0.127**
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022) (0.050)
Observations 1,016 962 887 812 746 656 584 489 418 350 238
R-squared 0.018 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.052
(Continues to the next page)
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Table B.2: Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel M. Ethnicity: Acholi
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.022** 0.028** 0.029** 0.022 0.027 0.028
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.040)
Observations 1,016 962 887 812 746 656 584 489 418 350 238
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.014 0.008 0.002
Panel N. Ethnicity: Others
I{Year of birth≥ 1979} -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 -0.021 -0.018 -0.017 -0.052** -0.034 -0.056 -0.187**
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034) (0.045) (0.080)
Observations 1,016 962 887 812 746 656 584 489 418 350 238
R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.028
Source. Research on Poverty, Agriculture, Environment, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the coefficient estimate of the interaction between
the year of birth minus the cutoff of 1979 and an indicator for it being equal to or larger than the cutoff from the regression of female years of education. Reported in
parentheses are standard errors robust for heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions
include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females
aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff. Due to missing values, the number of observations differs across
regressions.
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Table B.3: Estimated Effects of Female Education on Marital Probability.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel A. Treatment effect estimates with linear specification
Treatment effect -0.111*** -0.080*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.058*** -0.039** -0.034 -0.011 0.023 0.047 -0.084
(0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.035) (0.023) (0.030) (0.039) (0.099)
Observations 1077 991 895 806 736 641 558 472 399 331 232
Panel B. Treatment effect estimates with quadratic specification
Treatment effect -0.011 -0.018 -0.009 -0.007 0.035 -0.057 0.018 -0.050 0.073 0.051 -0.150
(0.030) (0.029) (0.045) (0.030) (0.056) (0.047) (0.029) (0.054) (0.255) (0.076) (0.134)
Observations 1077 991 895 806 736 641 558 472 399 331 232
Panel C. Akaike information criterion (AIC) from the reduced-form regression of marital probability
Linear model 669.2 572.4† 475.6† 397.9† 309.8 222.1 176.0† 155.7 81.7† 79.9† 105.5
Quadratic model 653.1† 573.9 477.1 400.5 309.2† 218.0† 177.4 154.6† 83.5 82.1 102.6†
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. Panels A and B show the treatment effect estimate of
female years of education on the indicator for ever having married. Panel C shows the AIC values from the reduced-form regressions of the marital indicator
on the first-stage regressors. Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, **
for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. † indicates that the AIC is smaller relative to the other model specification; i.e., the focal model specification is preferred to
the other. All regressions include dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49
who married at the age of 24 or below and for females born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.4: Robustness Check Using Only Females Who were 24 Years or Younger at Their First Marriage.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
1 if having brideprice paid -0.084** -0.121** -0.105** -0.116** -0.024 -0.030 -0.084 -0.024 -0.035 -0.075 -0.715
(0.050) (0.060) (0.052) (0.066) (0.042) (0.047) (0.121) (0.059) (0.069) (0.114) (2.309)
Observations 822 778 711 647 598 532 468 393 340 280 189
Age at marriage 0.761** 0.684** 0.456 0.438 0.254 -0.347 -1.643 -0.213 -0.426 -0.556 0.130
(0.362) (0.389) (0.358) (0.433) (0.369) (0.468) (1.456) (0.524) (0.621) (0.896) (1.455)
Observations 879 834 764 698 644 567 499 422 361 298 204
1 if love marriage 0.027 0.027 0.043** 0.033 0.018 0.009 -0.013 -0.023 -0.056* -0.092 0.020
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.043) (0.028) (0.040) (0.072) (0.094)
Observations 886 839 770 703 648 570 502 424 362 300 206
1 if living premarital LC1 0.056 0.029 0.012 0.021 0.008 -0.012 -0.026 -0.029 0.014 0.076 -0.005
(0.045) (0.043) (0.038) (0.042) (0.033) (0.039) (0.071) (0.043) (0.054) (0.086) (0.175)
Observations 889 842 771 705 648 569 501 424 362 299 205
1 if polygynous union 0.009 -0.010 -0.026 -0.007 0.008 0.013 -0.022 -0.019 0.003 -0.005 -0.053
(0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038) (0.031) (0.037) (0.064) (0.035) (0.042) (0.054) (0.125)
Observations 894 847 776 708 651 572 504 426 364 301 206
1 if not divorced -0.015 -0.048 -0.047 -0.046 -0.021 -0.013 -0.054 -0.015 -0.036 -0.015 -0.021
(0.040) (0.046) (0.044) (0.049) (0.030) (0.035) (0.056) (0.037) (0.046) (0.041) (0.067)
Observations 755 715 655 602 559 493 432 371 319 264 182
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect estimate for the prob-
ability of receiving brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data. Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Statistical
significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the
dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49 who married at the age of 24 or below
and were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff. Due to missing values, the number of observations differs across regressions.
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Table B.5: First-Stage Estimation Results of Partner’s Years of Education.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Outcome Male years of education
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
I{Year of birth≥1979} -0.041 -0.016 -0.021 0.010 0.069 0.045 0.073 -0.071 -0.038 -0.013 0.083
×(Year of birth−1979) (0.068) (0.077) (0.087) (0.101) (0.119) (0.145) (0.182) (0.218) (0.285) (0.409) (0.942)
Observations 747 705 660 612 563 506 452 369 315 249 179
R-squared 0.200 0.199 0.196 0.214 0.221 0.230 0.279 0.342 0.404 0.425 0.425
F statistic 0.370 0.043 0.059 0.009 0.339 0.097 0.162 0.106 0.018 0.001 0.008
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the coefficient estimate of the interaction
between the year of birth minus the cutoff of 1979 and an indicator for it being equal to or larger than the cutoff from the regression of male years of education.
Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust for heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p <
0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies for the ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates.
The regressions use males born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.66
Table B.6: Robustness Check of Main Results Allowing for a Potential Jump at the Cutoff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
1 if brideprice paid -0.107** -0.126** -0.111** -0.111** -0.033 -0.047 -0.086 -0.031 -0.026 -0.080 0.010
(0.052) (0.056) (0.048) (0.056) (0.035) (0.045) (0.078) (0.044) (0.053) (0.089) (0.094)
Observations 878 832 762 695 640 562 495 417 356 294 201
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect estimate for
the probability of receiving brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data. Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroscedas-
ticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth
minus the cutoff, and the dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49
who have ever married and were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.7: Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the Reduced-Form Regression of Brideprice Receipt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel A. 1 if having brideprice paid
Linear model 1118.4† 1055.3† 964.7† 898.1† 827.0† 740.6† 669.3† 550.4† 475.3† 392.5† 266.4
Quadratic model 1119.4 1057.8 966.9 901.6 829.7 743.3 672.2 552.1 476.4 395.2 265.6†
Panel B. 1 if having brideprice paid (0 if unmarried)
Linear model 1363.6† 1275.8† 1159.8† 1074.2† 987.3† 870.3† 777.9† 647.1† 549.0† 460.5† 318.4
Quadratic model 1364.9 1278.2 1161.6 1076.4 989.5 872.3 781.1 649.5 551.1 463.0 315.6†
Panel C. 1 if having brideprice paid (1 if unmarried)
Linear model 1324.5 1231.3† 1122.2† 1032.2† 934.6† 831.5† 747.2† 621.9† 540.1† 445.5† 321.2†
Quadratic model 1322.7† 1234.8 1126.0 1035.7 937.1 833.4 750.0 623.5 542.7 449.2 322.5
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the values of the AIC for the
reduced-form regression of brideprice receipt status. † indicates that the AIC is smaller relative to the other model specification, i.e., the focal model
specification is preferred to the other. Panel A use the females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and were born in years within the indicated
bandwidth of the cutoff. Panels B and C use all the females in our data, regardless of marital status, born in years within the indicated bandwidth
of the cutoff, where the brideprice receipt status for never married females are all coded as one in Panel B and zero in Panel C. All the regressions
include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates.
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Table B.8: Robustness Check of Main Results Using the LIML Estimation Method.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
1 if brideprice paid -0.099* -0.123** -0.110** -0.109* -0.031 -0.040 -0.081 -0.031 -0.039 -0.082 -0.393
(0.051) (0.055) (0.048) (0.056) (0.035) (0.046) (0.089) (0.044) (0.056) (0.090) (0.588)
Observations 878 832 762 695 640 562 495 417 356 294 201
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect estimate for
the probability of receiving brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data, using the LIML estimation method. Reported in parentheses are
standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions
include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions
are run for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.9: Robustness Check of the Main Results with the Alternative Cutoff of the Year 1983.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Bandwidth 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel A. First-stage estimation results
I{Year of birth≥ 1983} 0.175 0.085 0.014 -0.152 -0.064 0.102 -0.738
(0.106) (0.121) (0.137) (0.192) (0.265) (0.359) (0.585)
Observations 635 585 503 434 372 311 238
R-squared 0.250 0.260 0.282 0.307 0.333 0.395 0.464
F statistics 2.697 0.492 0.010 0.625 0.059 0.080 1.595
Panel B. Treatment effect estimates
1 if brideprice paid -0.158* -0.451 -1.255 0.180 -0.364 -0.040 0.061
(0.110) (0.651) (6.237) (0.320) (1.743) (0.470) (0.111)
Observations 623 574 494 425 364 304 235
Age at marriage 0.600 1.200 3.124 -2.821 5.525 0.760 1.093*
(0.588) (1.310) (6.879) (7.095) (25.619) (2.975) (0.769)
Observations 628 578 498 429 368 310 237
1 if love marriage 0.048 0.050 0.927 -0.197 -1.477 0.467 -0.112*
(0.046) (0.100) (4.271) (0.293) (11.020) (1.192) (0.086)
Observations 629 580 500 431 370 310 237
1 if living in pre-marital LC1 0.017 0.097 2.407 -0.183 -0.238 0.045 -0.003
(0.080) (0.258) (32.338) (0.288) (1.544) (0.323) (0.093)
Observations 631 581 499 431 369 308 235
1 if in polygynous union 0.000 -0.020 -0.863 0.044 0.044 0.235 -0.059
(0.065) (0.149) (7.853) (0.136) (0.442) (0.806) (0.076)
Observations 635 585 503 434 372 311 238
1 if not divorced -0.002 -0.061 -0.435 0.020 -0.010 -0.068 -0.024
(0.075) (0.132) (3.340) (0.147) (0.123) (0.283) (0.095)
Observations 543 502 429 374 320 269 207
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect estimate
for the probability of receiving a brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data using the year of birth of 1983 as the alternative cutoff.
Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust for heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05,
and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies for ethnicity and region of residence
at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and were born in years within the indicated
bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.10: Robustness Check of Main Results Excluding the Langi and Those from the Northern Region.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel A. Excluding the Langi
1 if brideprice paid -0.126** -0.150** -0.136** -0.147** -0.043 -0.053 -0.104 -0.037 -0.048 -0.084 -0.280
(0.064) (0.070) (0.063) (0.080) (0.045) (0.054) (0.108) (0.045) (0.058) (0.082) (0.280)
Observations 813 773 709 651 602 532 473 397 337 278 191
Panel B. Excluding the northern region
1 if brideprice paid -0.142** -0.175** -0.154** -0.173** -0.041 -0.050 -0.097 -0.048 -0.060 -0.095 -0.239
(0.072) (0.082) (0.072) (0.098) (0.051) (0.067) (0.132) (0.050) (0.066) (0.105) (0.209)
Observations 758 720 660 606 561 495 441 371 317 264 182
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect estimate for
the probability of receiving a brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data excluding the females of the Langi (Panel A) and from the Northern
region (Panel B) from the estimation sample. Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted
by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies for
ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and were born in
years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.11: Robustness Check of Main Results Conditioned on Parental Education.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel A. Controlling for mother’s years of education
1 if brideprice paid -0.028 -0.065 -0.052 -0.035 0.019 0.033 0.112 0.077 0.071 0.179 -0.143
(0.062) (0.070) (0.060) (0.085) (0.055) (0.068) (0.184) (0.074) (0.098) (0.319) (0.273)
Observations 625 591 539 492 457 401 350 291 244 203 133
Panel B. Controlling for mother’s years of education and its missingness
1 if brideprice paid -0.098** -0.119** -0.112** -0.113* -0.030 -0.042 -0.094 -0.028 -0.044 -0.090 -0.309
(0.049) (0.052) (0.049) (0.058) (0.036) (0.051) (0.115) (0.052) (0.065) (0.111) (0.363)
Observations 878 832 762 695 640 562 495 417 356 294 201
Panel C. Controlling for father’s years of education
1 if brideprice paid -0.034 -0.053 -0.039 -0.029 0.033 0.001 0.010 0.028 0.039 0.027 0.041
(0.059) (0.059) (0.052) (0.059) (0.052) (0.053) (0.116) (0.075) (0.061) (0.069) (0.444)
Observations 602 570 519 477 441 387 334 282 237 199 133
Panel D. Controlling for father’s years of education and its missingness
1 if brideprice paid -0.091** -0.114** -0.107** -0.118* -0.033 -0.046 -0.095 -0.030 -0.037 -0.076 -0.606
(0.045) (0.048) (0.046) (0.061) (0.036) (0.051) (0.107) (0.051) (0.058) (0.093) (1.512)
Observations 878 832 762 695 640 562 495 417 356 294 201
Panel E. Controlling for both parents’ years of education
1 if brideprice paid -0.028 -0.073 -0.055 -0.020 0.021 0.009 0.050 0.086 0.099 0.265 -0.342
(0.073) (0.082) (0.068) (0.085) (0.061) (0.071) (0.156) (0.105) (0.143) (0.637) (1.026)
Observations 536 508 461 421 394 346 298 253 210 175 114
Panel F. Controlling for both parents’ years of education and their missingness
1 if brideprice paid -0.094** -0.118** -0.112** -0.123* -0.033 -0.048 -0.098 -0.027 -0.045 -0.096 -0.444
(0.047) (0.050) (0.048) (0.063) (0.037) (0.054) (0.120) (0.054) (0.066) (0.123) (0.745)
Observations 878 832 762 695 640 562 495 417 356 294 201
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect estimate for
the probability of receiving brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data, controlling for the years of education of the sample females’ parents:
mothers’ (Panels A and B), fathers’ (Panels C and D), and both (Panels E and F). Since parental education variables have relatively high shares of
missing values, we tried an additional specification with an indicator for parental education being missing (Panels B, D, and F). Reported in parentheses
are standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions
include dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married
and were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.12: Robustness Check of Main Results Conditioned on Religion.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel A. Controlling for own pre-marital religion
1 if brideprice paid -0.097* -0.120** -0.108** -0.107* -0.029 -0.037 -0.081 -0.026 -0.018 -0.084 -0.468
(0.052) (0.055) (0.049) (0.057) (0.036) (0.047) (0.096) (0.046) (0.051) (0.087) (0.858)
Observations 873 827 757 691 636 559 492 414 354 293 200
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect estimate for
the probability of receiving brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data, controlling for own pre-marital religion dummies. Statistical signifi-
cance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the
dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and
were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.13: Robustness Check of Main Results Allowing for a Differential Trend in and after 2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
1 if brideprice paid -0.126* -0.138** -0.104** -0.112* -0.021 -0.034 -0.070 -0.032 -0.038 -0.084 -3.72
(0.079) (0.076) (0.060) (0.073) (0.044) (0.053) (0.080) (0.048) (0.054) (0.094) (54.72)
Observations 867 823 754 688 635 558 491 414 354 292 199
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect estimate for
the probability of receiving a brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data, allowing for a differential trend for females whose first marriage
took place before or after the year of 2007. Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted
by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies for
ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and were born in
years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.14: The Estimated Impact of Female Education on Whether Women Have a Non-agricultural Job.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
1 if the female has a
non-agricultural job
-0.002 0.024 -0.018 -0.039 -0.016 0.002 -0.047 0.046 0.028 0.069 0.061
(0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.047) (0.036) (0.042) (0.083) (0.045) (0.052) (0.066) (0.150)
Observations 891 844 773 705 648 570 502 424 362 300 205
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the estimated treatment effect
of female education on whether females have a non-agricultural job for selected bandwidths. Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust to het-
eroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant, the year of
birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49
who have ever married and were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.15: Robustness Check of Main Results Excluding a Few Control Cohorts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bandwidth 13 years 12 years 11 years 10 years 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years 4 years 3 years
Panel A. Excluding 1 youngest control cohort
1 if brideprice paid -0.096* -0.124* -0.108** -0.105* -0.031 -0.039 -0.067 -0.02 -0.013 -0.044 0.194
(0.058) (0.064) (0.053) (0.061) (0.036) (0.048) (0.088) (0.049) (0.07) (0.117) (0.407)
Observations 852 806 736 669 614 536 469 391 330 268 175
Panel B. Excluding 2 youngest control cohorts
1 if brideprice paid -0.112* -0.14** -0.122** -0.123* -0.041 -0.05 -0.084 -0.032 -0.044 -0.121 0.338
(0.063) (0.071) (0.058) (0.069) (0.038) (0.05) (0.095) (0.053) (0.083) (0.148) (0.846)
Observations 818 772 702 635 580 502 435 357 296 234 141
Panel C. Excluding 3 youngest control cohorts
1 if brideprice paid -0.115* -0.142** -0.128** -0.128* -0.049 -0.059 -0.079 -0.038 -0.044 -0.083
(0.062) (0.07) (0.059) (0.068) (0.037) (0.048) (0.081) (0.045) (0.069) (0.117)
Observations 785 739 669 602 547 469 402 324 263 201
Panel D. Excluding 4 youngest control cohorts
1 if brideprice paid -0.128* -0.15** -0.13** -0.125* -0.045 -0.053 -0.069 -0.03 -0.024
(0.069) (0.073) (0.061) (0.067) (0.037) (0.046) (0.072) (0.042) (0.069)
Observations 747 701 631 564 509 431 364 286 225
Panel E. Excluding 5 youngest control cohorts
1 if brideprice paid -0.119* -0.143** -0.124** -0.122* -0.049 -0.053 -0.078 -0.03
(0.061) (0.068) (0.057) (0.063) (0.036) (0.045) (0.083) (0.049)
Observations 716 670 600 533 478 400 333 255
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology in Uganda in 2015. Notes. Notes. This table shows the treatment effect esti-
mate for the probability of receiving brideprice for all the available bandwidths in our data, when excluding females born in years before but close to
1979. The estimation cannot be done when exluding a large number of cohorts and using a small bandwidth as this results in a perfect collinearity be-
tween the treatment indicator and the intercept due to a lack of control females in the estimation sample. Reported in parentheses are standard errors
robust to heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p < 0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. All regressions include a constant,
the year of birth minus the cutoff, and the dummies for ethnicity and region of residence at age seven as covariates. The regressions are run for females
aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff.
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Table B.16: Simple Regression for Assortative Matching.
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome Partner’s years of education
Female years of education 0.466*** 0.467*** 0.432***
(0.089) (0.091) (0.103)
I{Year of birth ≥ 1979} 0.075 -0.063 0.110
(0.652) (0.712) (0.971)
I{Year of birth ≥ 1979} 0.033 0.054 0.102
×(Years of education) (0.112) (0.120) (0.139)
Observations 397 354 353
R-squared 0.218 0.452 0.529
Premarital controls N Y Y
Year of marriage N N Y
Source. Research on Poverty, Environment, Agriculture, and Technology
in Uganda in 2015. Notes. This table shows the selected coefficient esti-
mate of female years of education from the regression of their partners’
years of education. Reported in parentheses are standard errors robust
for heteroscedasticity. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for p <
0.01, ** for p < 0.05, and * for p < 0.1. Premarital controls include the
dummies for ethnicity and for the region of residence at age seven. The
regressions are run for females aged 24 to 49 who have ever married and
were born in years within the indicated bandwidth of the cutoff. Due to
missing values, the number of observations differs across regressions.
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